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SUMMARY
Economists, management theorists, business strategists, and governments alike
recognize knowledge as the single most important resource in today's global
economy. Because of its relationship to technological progress and economic
growth, many governments have taken a keen interest in knowledge, specifically
its production, transfer, and use. This paper focuses on the technical report as a
product for disseminating the results of aerospace research and development
(R&D) and its use and importance to aerospace engineers and scientists. The
emergence of knowledge as an intellectual asset, its relationship to innovation, and
its importance in a global economy provides the context for the paper. The
relationships between government and knowledge and between government and
innovation are used to placed knowledge within the context of publicly-funded
R&D. Data, including the reader preferences of NASA technical reports, are
derived from the NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project,
a ten-year study of knowledge diffusion in the U.S. aerospace industry.
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge is a building block, an essential ingredient of technological innovation. Innovation
is necessary for creating new processes, products, systems, or services. Advances in knowledge
are widely regarded as major sources of improvements in existing processes, products, systems,
or services. The rate at which knowledge is created, diffused (i.e., spread, distributed, trans-
mitted), and absorbed or utilized influences the rate of technological innovation and progress
(Mansfield, 1984, 1981). Advancements in technological innovation require investments in capi-
tal, labor, and knowledge to produce tangible results that are sold in today's global markets. A
firm that produces processes, products, or systems or delivers services is deemed competitive if
it can provide goods and services of superior quality or lower costs than its competitors. Coun-
tries with many competitive firms typically have high rates of economic growth and standards
of living, hence the interest on the part of governments in technological innovation and progress.
For many economists, knowledge is the catalyst that helps allocate resources and makes
a free market function. Economists now view knowledge as an engine of change and embrace
it in their theoretical constructs. Many economists see knowledge living up to Daniel Bell's
(1973) prediction: Knowledge will replace capital and energy as the primary wealth-creating
assets, just as capital and energy replaced labor and land (Haeckel and Nolan, 1993). In an
economic sense, knowledge differs from other so-called commodities or resources: (a) it is not
depleted with use, it is sharable, and traditionally, it has had no intrinsic value; (b) it is difficult
to distinguish between knowledge and the medium in which it is contained; (c) except for
knowledge-based products and services designed to be sold, most knowledge lacks markets in
which value can be determined by supply and demand; (d) unlike other so-called commodities
or resources, the overwhelming importance of knowledge is as a public good (Noll, 1993); and
(e) numerous individuals located at various points across the globe can possess the same
knowledge, unlike other commodities or resources (Brinberg, Pinelli, and Barclay, 1995; Brinberg
and Pinelli, 1993). The past 20 years have witnessed the propensity of knowledge to cross
national boundaries, a phenomenon that observers have labeled the globalization of knowledge.
The boundary-spanning propensity of knowledge is due mainly to improvements in communi-
cations (e.g., the Internet), transportation (e.g., international air travel), and the fact that
developed and developing countries are spending more on creating and acquiring knowledge.
The globalization of knowledge requires that firms and organizations involved in innovation
construct and employ strategies for exploiting extramural research and development strategies and
systems for acquiring knowledge produced around the world to compete in today's global
economy (lves and Jarvenpae, 1993).
KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge has replaced financial capital as the main producer of wealth. A new "informa-
tion capitalism" now dominates the world economy; industries that have moved into the center
of the economy in the last 40 years have as their business the production and distribution of
knowledge and information (Drucker, 1993a, 1993b; Machlup, 1962). Knowledge qua capital
represents a new and vital factor that must be added to the three factors of production--land,
labor, and financial capital----traditionally studied by economists (Zhang, 1993). However,
knowledge qua capital, or production asset, defies easy definition; therefore, existing economic
theories cannot be applied to explain its behavior (Drucker, 1994). Schmoolder (1966) points
out that knowledge may be valued for its own sake, as a "public good," or for its application,
through which it becomes a "private" or "capital good." Theorists posit a positive relationship
between knowledge accumulation and economic growth (Hayek, 1945). To develop a theory of
the economics of knowledge, Romer (1990), Schwartz (1992), Scott (1989), and others have
begun to investigate the economic behavior of knowledge and its role in innovation.
The intemational business community has come to view knowledge, particularly
specialized knowledge, as an essential ingredient for competitive success (Blackler, 1993).
Management theorists expect improvements in knowledge-based work to contribute significantly
to industrial growth and gains in productivity in the U.S. and abroad (Davenport, Jarvenpaa, and
Beers, 1996). Effectively managing the creation, transfer, and use of knowledge resources is now
regarded as critical for the survival and success of organizations and societies alike (Hedlund and
Nonaka, 1993). Firms in such diverse industries as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, financial
services, and telecommunications already consider the strategic management of knowledge---the
"intellectual assets" of an organization (Hall, 1989, p. 53)ma key corporate activity and have
implemented knowledge management programs. These programs emphasize the criticality of
knowledge as a competitive asset and seek to maximize the ability of an organization to integrate
and use various kinds of knowledge (Aaker, 1989; Bartmess and Cerny, 1993; Buckholtz, 1995;
Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995).
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Knowledge Defined
Knowledge has been variously labeled, described, and defined. It can be scientific or
technical, embodied or disembodied, tacit or explicit, and product or process knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is embodied in the laws, principles, and theorems of a specific discipline
(e.g., Newton's three laws of motion in physics). It is easily codified and is unlikely to be
altered by language and culture. Technical knowledge tends to be narrowly focused or specific;
it is not always predictable, and it does not necessarily spring from scientific knowledge.
Technical knowledge is not the application of scientific knowledge. It may be applicable to a
particular technology like the manufacture of aircraft, but it is not easily transferred or applied
to another technology. It is cumulative to an individual, groups of individuals, and organizations;
it is derived from learning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962a; von Hippel and Tyre, 1995; Wright, 1936)
or learning-by-using, and it is not easily or accurately codified. For example, after a particular
jet engine has been in use for a decade, the cost of maintenance may have declined to only 30%
of the initial level as a result of learning-by-using (Rosenberg, 1982).
Learning-by-doing and learning-by-using generate a substantial amount of what Rosenberg
(1982) defines as embodied and disembodied knowledge. In the first case, early experience with
a new technology leads to a better understanding of the relationship between design
characteristics and performance that permits subsequent improvements, which over time lead to
an optimal design of an aircraft, system, or component. Optimization may be achieved by
applying advancements made in other areas like materials, manufacturing, or miniaturization.
Disembodied knowledge results in slight but often continuing changes in design and operation
that result from the experience of making or operating an aircraft. Prolonged experience with
an aircraft, system, or component produces knowledge that can be used to lengthen the service
life of an aircraft or reduce its operating cost. Rosenberg makes the point that disembodied
knowledge is critical to aircraft design and manufacture because it is only through actual
operation that the true performance (i.e., characteristics and costs) and full potential of a new
aircraft can be determined. Vincenti (1992, 1990) provides excellent definitions and examples
of knowledge as applied to aeronautical engineering. Inside the Black Box--Technology and
Economics (Rosenberg, 1982, Chapter 6) offers convincing examples of both learning-by-doing
and learning-by-using within the context of aircraft production.
When a firm or organization innovates, that is, creates or improves a process, product,
system, or service, it generally does so by using both tacit and explicit knowledge. Polanyi
(1966) provides the following basic definitions for these two types of knowledge: Tacit
knowledge is personal, context-specific, and therefore, hard to formalize and communicate;
explicit knowledge is codified and refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic
language and includes grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, and
manuals. Bateson (1973) offers the following distinctions between these two types of knowledge:
Tacit knowledge tends to be experiential and subjective. It is derived from practice, created
"here" and "now" in a specific context, and entails what Bateson refers to as an "analog" quality;
whereas explicit knowledge tends to be rational and objective. It is derived from what is known
and accepted, was created "there" and "then," and it is oriented toward context-free theory. Tacit
knowledge cannot always be codified because it often contains an important dimension of"know-
how." Individuals may know more than they are able to articulate. When knowledge has a high
tacit component, it is extremely difficult to transfer without personal contact, demonstration, and
involvement. Indeed, in the absence of close human contact, the diffusion of knowledge is
sometimes impossible (Teece, 1981). Von Hippel (1994) argues that tacit, unlike other forms
of knowledge, is often costly, difficult, and sometimes impossible to acquire, transfer, and use
owing to the attributes of tacit knowledge itself. For an explanation of tacit and explicit
knowledge within the context of technical knowledge, see Alic, Branscomb, Brooks, Carter, and
Epstein (1992). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, Chapter 2) have proposed a theory of knowledge
creation relative to the dynamics of technological innovation that contains four modes of
knowledge conversion: tacit to tacit (socialization), tacit to explicit (externalization), explicit to
explicit (combination), and explicit to tacit (internalization).
Knowledge as Intellectual Capital
Knowledge is an integral factor in innovation, technological change, and the economy
(Nelson, 1996; Drucker, 1985). Edvinsson and Malone (1997, p. 3), referencing Wriston (1992),
state that "the new source of wealth is not material, it is information, knowledge applied to work
to create value." Wright (1994) notes that knowledge and knowledge-based resources are both
enabling and constraining factors in the development of innovation and competitive advantage.
Whereas its importance may not be fully understood in terms of economic theory, the belief that
knowledge is playing an increasingly important role in the world's economy is now accepted as
fact (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 1996). It is now widely accepted that a firm's competitive
advantage flows from its unique knowledge (Nonaka, 1991). Competitive advantage is often
determined more by the knowledge that a firm is able to keep to itself and less by knowledge
that is readily diffused, imitated, exhausted, or appropriated (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Spender,
1993). Persistent, sustained competitive advantage cannot reside within the latter.
Knowledge as a concept is open to different interpretations (Popper, 1972). It is different
from data and information (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993). Although not always clear-cut, the
distinction among the three in production processes is very important (Bohn, 1994). Data are
what come directly from sensors, reporting on the measured level of some variable. Information
is "data" that have been organized or given structure, that is, placed in context and thus endowed
with meaning (Dretske, 1981; Glazer, 1991). Information tells the current or past status of some
part of the production system. Knowledge goes further; it allows the making of predictions,
causal associations, or prescriptive decisions about what to do (Bohn, 1994). Knowledge usually
manifests itself as a product or service. Firms create products using both internal and external
knowledge.
At a fundamental level, knowledge is created by individuals. The organization or firm
creates a context and provides the environment for individuals to create knowledge (Cleveland,
1985; Lave and Wenger, 1991). Organizational knowledge creation, therefore, should be
understood in terms of a process that "organizationally" amplifies and crystallizes the knowledge
created by individuals (Nonaka, 1991). In its simplest form, knowledge has been defined as
"knowing things" about something. Through the centuries, society has tended to recognize and
reward individuals and groups of individuals (e.g., legal and medical professions) who know
things (Sakaiya, 1991). Knowledge as power, knowledge residing within the firm, knowledge
gained from learning-by-doing and learning-by-using, knowledge creation and utilization, and
knowledge communities are well established concepts.
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Theconceptof knowledgeasintellectualassetsor intellectualcapital, although not new,
has recently garnered significant attention within the context of knowledge-intensive or knowl-
edge-based organizations, innovation, and knowledge management (Stewart, 1997). Intellectual
assets have been categorized by Hall (1989) as intellectual property (i.e., assets with property
rights, like patents, trademarks, and copyrights) and knowledge assets (i.e., reputation, goodwill,
personal and organizational networks, databases, and the knowledge and experience of
employees). Brooking (1997) has identified four categories of intellectual capital--market assets,
intellectual property assets, human-centered assets, and infrastructure assets.
Market assets are derived from a company's relationship with its market and customers.
For example, market assets for the aeronautics portion of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) include customers (both civilian and military), reputation (and integrity)
in the marketplace, repeat business (especially when customers have alternative choices), and
product line(s) (knowledge created by NASA and the problem-solving capability of the
organization).
lnteUectuaIproperty assets include know-how, trade secrets, copyrights, patents, and trade
and service marks. In the case of such public entities as the NASA aeronautics program,
intellectual assets have three dimensions. First is the collective know-how, skill, and experience
of the workforce. In NASA aeronautics, know-how includes what the enterprise as a whole
knows about aeronautics, the related disciplines, or a particular aspect of aeronautics. A second
dimension concerns the protection of intellectual property. Working with both commercial and
military aeronautics, NASA is required to protect intellectual property that is propriety to a
company like Boeing or Lockheed Martin or that is classified for reasons of national security.
The third dimension concerns the NASA aeronautical knowledge base, including the diffusion
of the knowledge created through public funding, in particular, those research results that can
provide the U.S. aeronautics enterprise with an advantage over competitors.
Human-centered assets are the collective expertise, creative and problem-solving
capability, leadership, and entrepreneurial and managerial skills embodied in the employees of
the organization. Collectively, according to Brooking (1997), they constitute a knowledge-based
workforce whose expertise resides within their heads. Human-centered assets differ from market,
intellectual, and infrastructure assets in that they cannot be owned by the company. It is
expensive to hire, sustain, and train employees. Consequently, organizations seeking to maximize
their return on investment (ROI) must (a) know what skills, knowledge, and expertise each
employee possesses; (b) provide an environment conducive to learning and collaboration; (c)
encourage professional development; and (d) know how and why each employee is valuable to
the organization. Human-centered assets, past and present, combine to give NASA its
aeronautical know-how. Infrastructure assets include the facilities, elements, and components
of the organization. They are the skeleton and glue of an organization (Brooking, 1997). The
condition and operation of these assets have a direct bearing on the collective efficiency and
productivity of the human-centered assets. Common infrastructure assets include buildings, roads,
and utilities. The infrastructure assets within NASA aeronautics include, for example, the many
unique wind tunnels (e.g., Ice-Research Tunnel), computational facilities (e.g., Numeric
Aerodynamic Simulator), and research aircraft (e.g., F-15-XL). In a knowledge-based organiza-
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tion, information technology (i.e., hardware, software, and networks) is considered an important
infrastructure asset. The relative age, compatibility, and interoperability of information
technology indirectly affects an organization's market assets, intellectual property, and human-
centered assets.
GOVERNMENT, KNOWLEDGE, AND INNOVATION
Although innovation is an investment decision generally made within a firm or organization, it
is also influenced, to a large extent, by public policy and the resulting laws and regulations that
affect the mobilization of capital and labor (David, 1986). Government plays a major role in
creating the knowledge that drives innovation through direct funding of science and technology.
In addition, government decisions potentially have a significant impact on knowledge diffusion.
Governments typically support a range of programs, from those that simply collect knowledge
and make it accessible, to those that actively seek to couple knowledge with potential bene-
ficiaries. Finally, the adoption and utilization of knowledge and innovation can be influenced
through a variety of programs that provide special considerations, incentives, credits, and
protections affecting investments in labor and capital.
Government and Knowledge
Governments adopt strategies and policies that they determine will enable their individual
countries to be safe from external attack and to be economically viable. Innovation strategies
may be categorized as follows: "mission-oriented," "diffusion-oriented," and some combination
thereof (Ergas, 1987). The former is characterized by large-scale project work, centering on large
firms with a heavy emphasis on areas such as defense, nuclear power, and aerospace. The latter
emphasizes broader, more generalized forms of investment, notably in pre-competitive, col-
laborative research, standards development, and training. The former strategy emphasized the
creation of knowledge over utilization of existing knowledge. In a mission-oriented strategy,
knowledge diffusion is often not included or it is added as an after thought. A diffusion-oriented
strategy seeks to strike a balance between knowledge creation and knowledge utilization. The
diffusion of knowledge is a strategic and integral component of a diffusion-oriented strategy.
Government innovation strategy that emphasizes knowledge creation, in and of itself, will
not ensure a nation's competitiveness in today's global economy. As Alic (1991, pp. 65-66)
points out, "innovation depends heavily on existing knowledge, often more so than on new
knowledge .... New knowledge, at least in the sense of research results, rarely has direct bearing
on competitive outcomes." To compete effectively in a changed global economy, nations that
emphasize knowledge creation as an innovation strategy might be wise to rethink such policies
for the following reasons. First, knowledge has become a competitive resource and the currency
of the global economy. Second, knowledge as an asset has profound implications for government
policies and programs affecting innovation and competitiveness. Third, in a global economy,
knowledge becomes an asset rather than a by-product of research and development (R&D).
Fourth, given the globalization of knowledge, a diffusion-oriented, capability-enhancing inno-
vation policy becomes desirable over a mission-oriented innovation policy as a strategy for
government-supported innovation (Ergas, 1987). Fifth, the effectiveness of a diffusion-oriented,
capability-enhancinginnovationpolicy is increasedby including a system and methods for
effectivelyandstrategicallymanagingtheknowledgethatresultsfrom government-fundedR&D.
Governmentinnovationstrategiesthatemphasizeknowledge creation reflect the dominant
political-social view that (a) the route to successful innovation is through basic research, (b) the
knowledge necessary for successful innovation comes from basic research, (c) technology is little
more than applied science, and (d) apart from basic research, the remaining components of pro-
duct and process innovation (e.g., design, development, production) are not the purview of gov-
ernment and, therefore, should be left to the private sector. Increasingly, the importance of the
linkage between the knowledge generated by basic research and commercial innovation has come
under challenge (Kash, 1992). In fact, critics have begun to question the existence of a linkage.
Study results indicate that economically successful innovation is frequently the product of incre-
mental improvements in existing technologies (Kash, 1989) and that many breakthrough innova-
tions stem from invention or trial and error learning, rather than basic research (Constant, 1980).
Furthermore, innovation is an inherently uncertain undertaking that involves the use of
human and financial resources coupled with knowledge and technology to create new or improve
existing products, processes, and services. As a system, innovation interacts with government
at two basic levels. The first relates to harnessing knowledge and technology for public
purposes. The second arises from the reliance of innovation on social context; that is, education
and training to create a skilled workforce; a legal framework for defining and enforcing
intellectual property rights, laws and regulations conducive to innovation as an essential engine
of growth; and a variety of public policies that support the production, transfer, and use of
knowledge and technology.
Additionally, industrial R&D funds are becoming scarce. To maximize scant resources,
firms have begun developing R&D partnerships-----cooperative arrangements in which companies
join with other companies, universities, and government laboratories---to pursue their mutually
agreed-upon R&D objectives. The participation of government agencies and government
laboratories in R&D partnerships and cooperative arrangements raises questions about the proper
role of government in innovation. Participants in these arrangements agree to share costs,
resources, and expenses. The ownership and use of R&D results are usually covered in such
cooperative (written) arrangements. However, ownership, use, and protection of intellectual
property as a public or private good (and capturing its revenue, in particular) have become
increasingly contentious factors in many government, industry, and university arrangements.
The most highly developed, currently successful innovation is carried out by the part-
nerships (i.e., academia, government, and industry) that have evolved in aerospace, agriculture,
and medicine (Kash, 1989). These partnerships exist at the levels of complexes and networks.
A complex refers to all of the organizations in a particular sector (e.g., aerospace) that are either
involved in or contribute to the process of innovation in that sector. Each complex is char-
acterized by multiple and ever-changing networks involved in the innovation of the products,
processes, and systems specific to each sector. Networks are composed of the collective
expertise located in organizations that innovate and create the products, processes, and systems
used in the sector.
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Lastly, individuals, firms, andgovernmentsalike havebegunto recognizethe importance
of knowledge and technology to innovation (Drucker, 1985), for the wise use of knowledge and
technology has a direct bearing on a firm "s and nation's competitive advantage. Increased
spending on science and technology by all industrialized nations, coupled with global trans-
portation and communications capabilities, has decreased the lead time that any firm may have
with respect to acquiring and applying knowledge and technology. Consequently, many firms
and nations have come to view both explicit and tacit knowledge (i.e., knowledge embedded in
processes and products; Badaracco, 1991) and technology as strategic intellectual assets that can
be managed to gain or improve competitive advantage in a global economy (Alvesson, 1995).
Firms and nations now also accept that funding knowledge and technology creation and utiliza-
tion, although costly, are legitimate expenditures and, therefore, have begun to implement strat-
egies, policies, and tools for managing intellectual assets. The understanding of and commitment
to knowledge as a source of competitive advantage are quite different among governments.
Government and Innovation
The process of innovation, applied within a capitalist system, relies primarily on market
forces and the use of human, technical, and financial resources to create new and improve
existing processes, products, systems, and services. However, investments in creating and
improving knowledge differ from investments in physical capital in that the results, once
produced, become, in principle, free goods unless steps are taken to prevent that from happening
(Matthews, 1973). This creates a basic public policy dilemma. If exclusive rights are granted
to those investing in creating and improving knowledge, from a social perspective, the use of that
knowledge becomes wastefully restricted. If no such rights are granted, no incentive exists to
invest in creating and improving knowledge. Without knowledge, there is no innovation.
Innovation begets technical progress and economic growth, and economic growth fosters
technological innovation, creates jobs, and generally raises the standard of living. Therefore,
from a public policy perspective, government funding of science and technology provides
considerable social benefits.
Government interacts with the process of innovation at three essential levels (Ergas,
1987). First, the government promotes the generation of these critical public goods----tech-
nological innovation---through the production and purchase of goods and services. Though this
type of government involvement has frequently been limited to goods and services integral to
providing for the nation's defense and military security; governments have also intervened to
encourage knowledge creation and technological innovation that could benefit the commercial
sector. For example, NASA's precursor--the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA)--was charged with the creation and development of aeronautical knowledge and
technology that would benefit both military and commercial aviation. (Much, if not most of this
knowledge and technology, was documented in technical reports.) More frequently, many
governments around the world, including in some cases the United States, have targeted
commercially relevant knowledge and technological innovation as a critical component of their
overall economic security and competitiveness.
Second, the government facilitates the creation of knowledge and the development of
technological innovation and the creation of new and improved processes, products, systems, and
services by funding science and technology. Funding occurs at many levels--through entities
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such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), through Congressional legislation targeting
specific knowledge and technology needs, through grants to universities, and through partial
funding to a variety of research consortia such as the IC z (Innovation, Creativity, and Capital)
Institute at the University of Texas at Austin or the Agile Manufacturing Research Institutes
(AMRI) at Rensselaer, University of Texas at Arlington, and the University of Illinois.
Third, the government supports the education and training of engineers and scientists,
provides a legal system for defining and enforcing property rights and contracts, and maintains
a uniform system for conducting commerce (i.e., weights and measures, currency values, and
interest and exchange rates). Such activity helps to create the "human capital" imbued with the
requisite types of knowledge and skills that enables them to create private knowledge and
technology, to innovate, and to create private goods incentives (e.g., new and improved processes,
products, systems, and services) through patents and copyrights that will protect and generate
economic compensation for innovation, and to create a stable and predictable market environment
that is imperative for wealth-creating trade to occur.
Although every national government employs a variety of these "'intervention instruments"
to promote knowledge creation and innovation, tradition and political culture have combined to
forge different styles---some more "activist" than others--among nations. For example, "mission-
oriented" knowledge and technology strategies are characteristic of the U.S., the U.K., and
France. Germany has adopted a "diffusion-oriented" strategy. Japan has adopted a unique hybrid
approach to knowledge creation, technological development, and innovation. Moreover, European
countries---both individually and collectively--and Japan are more likely to intervene directly and
proactively (in knowledge creation, technological development, and innovation) using transparent
public policy tools to achieve specific goals, whereas the United States tends to intervene less
directly, only occasionally proactively, and often using less opaque public policy tools.
THE NASA TECHNICAL REPORT
The technical report is a primary means by which the results of R&D are documented and
disseminated throughout the U.S. aerospace industry. However, little is known about this
information product in terms of its actual use, importance, and value in diffusing the results of
R&D. NASA maintains scientific and technical information (STI) system for acquiring, pro-
cessing, announcing, publishing, and transferring the results of government-performed and
government-sponsored research. Within that system, the NASA technical report is considered
a primary mechanism for transferring the results of this research to the U.S. aerospace
community.
Use and Importance of NASA Technical Reports
Within the context of other forms of literature, about 78% of the participants used NASA
technical reports. Participants were asked to indicate the number of times they had used NASA
technical reports during a six-month period in the performance of their professional duties. On
the average, NASA technical reports were used about 11.5 times. Participants were asked to
indicate, from a list of choices, their reasons for not using NASA technical reports. Reasons for
nonuse, in decreasing order of frequency, include (a) not relevant to my research, (b) not used
in my discipline, and (c) not available or accessible. Participants who used NASA technical
reports were asked how they usually use them. The responses indicate that NASA technical
reports are used for three general purposes: education/professional development, research, and
management. About 64% indicate that they use NASA technical reports for research purposes
and about 16% indicate that they use NASA technical reports for education/professional
development. About 13% indicate they use NASA technical reports for management purposes.
NASA technical reports are important to U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists in the
performance of their professional duties. Using a 5-point scale, participants rated the importance
of NASA technical reports 3.51.
Factors Affecting Use of NASA Technical Reports
The relevant literature overwhelmingly favors accessibility as the single most important
determinant of use. It is, therefore, hypothesized that the influence of accessibility on use would
also apply to NASA technical reports. Participants who use them were asked to indicate the ex-
tent to which seven factors influenced the use of NASA technical reports. Overall, relevance ex-
erts the greatest influence on the use of NASA technical reports. Technical quality or reliability,
followed by accessibility exerts the greatest influence on the use of NASA technical reports.
Information-Seeking Behavior and NASA Technical Reports
Participants were asked if they had used NASA technical reports to complete their most
recent technical project, task, or problem. Next, these same participants who used them were
asked how they found out about NASA technical reports. Approximately 65% of the participants
indicated that they had used NASA technical reports to complete their most recent technical
project, task, or problem. In completing their most recent technical project, task, or problem,
participants used their personal collection of information first, followed by discussions with a co-
worker or key individual in their organization. Next, they searched the library or a database and,
asked a librarian.
RESULTS OF THE READER PREFERENCE SURVEY CONCERNING
NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER TECHNICAL REPORTS
To learn more about the preferences of U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists concerning the
format of NASA Langley Research Center-authored technical reports, we surveyed 133 report
producers (i.e., authors) and 137 report users in 1993 and 1994 using mail (self-reported)
questionnaires. The response rates for report producers (i.e., authors) was 68% and for users was
62%. Questions covered such topics as (a) the order in which report components are read, (b)
components used to determine if a report would be read, (c) those components that could be
deleted, (d) the placement of such components as the symbols list, (e) the desirability of a table
of contents, (f) the format of reference citations, (g) column layout and right margin treatment,
and (h) and person and voice.
Order in Which Users Read or Review Report Components
Survey respondents were asked to use the technical report provided and to number a list
yof report components to indicate the chronological sequence in which these components are gen-
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erally read. The question as it appeared in the questionnaire is shown below. The format for
a typical NASA LaRC technical report appears below. Please number IN ORDER, the
components you generally read/review. (For example, if you read the "ABSTRACT" first,
number it with a "1." Do not number those components you skip.
a. Title Page i. Description of Research Procedure
b. Foreword j. Results and Di_ussion
c. Preface k. Conclusions
d. Contents I. Appendixes
e. Summary m. References
f. Introduction n. Tables
g. Symbols List o..Figures
h. Glossary of Terms p. Abstract
Table 1 shows, for each component, the percentage of survey respondents who indicated
they read that component at some stage in the use sequence. The report components are listed
in descending frequency of use. For the internal respondents, the components read by the highest
percentage of readers were the results and discussion and the conclusions. Other components
read by more than 80% of the internal respondents were the introduction, description of the
research procedure, and the title page. For the external respondents, the components read by the
highest percentage of readers were the conclusions and the summary. Other components read by
more than 80% of the external respondents were the title page and the abstract. Components read
by 80% of both groups were the conclusions (94.7%), results and discussion (87.6%), intro-
duction (83.1%), title page (82.5%), and the summary (82.2%). Conversely, certain components
were read by very few respondents in either survey group. The foreword and preface had very
low usage rates: internal respondents 15.9%/15.2 and external respondents 38.9%/32.9%. (With
the exception of NASA Special Publications, NASA LaRC technical reports generally do not in-
clude a foreword or preface.) Other components read by less than half of both groups include
the glossary of terms (29.1%) and the symbols list (37.5%).
To clarify sequence of use of report components, a weighted average ranking was
calculated and is presented in Table 2. Weighted average rankings were used to determine the
order of use of the 16 report components. The weighted average rankings were obtained by
assigning weights based on specific order of use. A weight of 16 was assigned for the
component read first, 15 for components read second, decreasing sequentially to 1 for
components read sixteenth. The weighted was calculated by the formula
E nt w i
n_
where ni was the number of users reading a component in the
"ith" position, w i was the weight assigned for the "ith" position,
and n t was the total number of users who read that component in
any position.
When both groups were combined, the resulting mean sequence for the first six
components read was title page, abstract, summary, introduction, conclusions, and table of
contents. Examined separately, the internal and external groups showed the exact overall patterns
in sequential positions. Although the abstract appears on the last page of a NASA report, this
component was read by about 74% of the internal and 82% of the external respondents.
Moreover, the abstract was the second report component read by both report producers and users.
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Components Reviewed or Read to Determine Whether to Read the Full Report
The respondents were asked to indicate which report components (up to five) were used
to decide whether to read the report. Respondents were asked to indicate the order in which
these components were read. Table 3 lists the five components most frequently used by survey
respondents in reviewing reports for possible reading and the percentage use by each group. Re-
spondents from both groups identified the abstract (71.6%/67.7%) as the component most often
reviewed to determine if a report would actually be read. The summary (65.7%) was the com-
ponent utilized second (most often) by the respondents to the internal respondents as a screen-
ing tool. The conclusions (57.9%) was the component utilized second (most often) by the
respondents to the external respondents as a screening tool. lnternal respondents indicated the
summary, title page, conclusions, and introduction (listed decreasing frequency of use) as the
components most often reviewed to determine if a report would actually be read. External respon-
dents indicated the conclusions, title page, summary, and introduction (listed decreasing frequency
of use) as the components most often reviewed to determine if a report would actually be read.
Table 3. Components Most Commonly Used to Review/Read
LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Component
Abstract
Summary
l'itle Page
Conclusions
Introduction
Percentage of respondents indicating
use of a report component
Internal Survey
n= 137
71.6
65.7
57.7
54.9
36.7
External Survey
n = 133
67.7
47.7
57.2
57.9
34.0
Table 4 gives a weighted average ranking for order of use of the five components most
frequently reviewed in deciding whether to read a report. This table shows that the most
common sequence used by combined surveys was: title page, abstract, summary, introduction,
and conclusions. The use pattern for both internal and external groups was the same as that for
the combined surveys (i.e., both producers and users).
Report Components Which Could Be Deleted
Survey respondents were asked to list any NASA Langley-authored report components
(up to five) that could be deleted. The most dispensable components were thought to be the
foreword and preface by both survey groups. About 70% and 64% of the internal respondents
suggested deleting the preface and foreword, respectively. About 39% and 38% of the external
respondents suggested the foreword and the preface as components that could be deleted. About
23% of the internal respondents indicated deleting the table of contents. On the other hand, only
about 5% of the external respondents suggested that the table of contents could be deleted.
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Table4. WeightedAverageRanking: Order in Which Components Are Reviewed in
Deciding Whether to Read a LaRC-Authored Technical Report
Internal Survey
(n = 137)
Component
Title page
Abstract
Summary
Introduction
Conclusions
n
Weighted
avg. rank*
113 15.8
103 14.5
110 13.5
125 12.4
131 11.5
External Survey
(n = 133)
Component
Weighted
n avg. rank*
112 15.6
109 13.9
113 13.5
102 12.2
127 11.3
Title page
Abstract
Summary
Introduction
Conclusions
Combined Surveys
(n = 270)
Weighted
Component n avg. rank*
Title page 225 15.7
Abstract 212 14.2
Summary 223 13.5
Introduction 227 12.3
Conclusions 258 11.4
*Highest number indicates component was read first; lowest number indicates component was read last.
Desirability of a Table of Contents
Survey participants were asked a question concerning the need for and or desirability of
a table of contents in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. Summaries of the results from
the internal and external respondents are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Opinions of Respondents Concerning the Desirability of a Table of Contents
in All LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Yes, all should
No, only long reports
need it
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
%
21.2
78.8
29
108
External respondents
%
(n = 133)
53.4
46.6
75
58
About 21% of the internal respondents indicated that all NASA Langley-authored
technical reports (regardless of length) should contain a table of contents; however, of the
external respondents, 53.4% expressed the need for a table of contents in all NASA langley-
authored technical reports. Thus, although about 79% of the internal respondents indicated that
only long reports need a table of contents, about twice as many (53.4%) external (non-NASA
Langley) respondents expressed the desire for this component in all NASA Langley-authored
technical reports than did their internal counterparts.
Desirability of a Summary in Addition to an Abstract
Respondents were asked a question concerning the need for a summary (appearing in the
front) in addition to the abstract, which appears as back matter on the Report Documentation
15
Page(RDP) of NASA Langley-authoredtechnicalreports. Summariesof the resultsobtained
from theinternalandexternalrespondentsaregiven in Table6. Internalrespondentswereabout
evenlydivided aboutwhetherthemoredetailedsummaryshouldbe includedin NASA Langley-
authoredtechnicalreportsin additionto theabstract.A slightmajority (50.4%)favoredinclusion
Table 6. Opinionsof RespondentsConceming the Desirability of a Summary in Addition
to an Abstract in All LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Yes, include a summary, too
No, don't bother with it
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
50.4 69
49.6 68
External respondents
(n = 133)
% n
60.2 80
39.8 53
of both components. Among external respondents, however, 60.2% indicated that NASA
Langley-authored technical reports should have a summary in addition to an abstract.
Location of the Definition of Symbols and Glossary of Terms
Survey respondents were asked to indicate where in a NASA Langley-authored technical
report the definition of symbols and glossary of terms components should appear. Summaries
of the results from the internal and external respondents are given in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7. Opinions of Respondents Concerning the Location of the Symbols List
in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
After Contents
After Introduction
As an Appendix
Near front of report AND
where symbols appear
Near back of report AND
where symbols appear
NO Symbols List needed; just define the
symbol where it appears in the report
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
10.2 14
39.4 54
13.9 19
15.3 21
5.8 8
15.3 21
External respondents
(n = 133)
%
25.6
10.5
19.5
20.3
10.5
13.5
n
34
14
26
27
14
18
Concerning the location of the Symbols List, the response patterns from the internal and
external respondents were different. The largest percentage of internal (39.4%) and external
(25.6%) respondents chose the response, "after Introduction" and "after Contents." The second
highest percentages of both groups (15.3%) and (20.3%) chose "near front of report AND where
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symbolsappear." Thus, whenresults from thesetwo responseswere combined,a preference
(64.9% for internal respondentsand 56.4% for externalrespondents)was evident for the De-
finition of Termsto be locatednear thefront of the report asopposedto being locatedasback
matter.
Regardingthe locationof the Glossaryof Terms,the responsepatternsfrom the internal
and external respondentswere different. The largest percentageof the internal (46.7%)
respondentsselected"no glossaryof termsneeded;just definethe termwhere it appearsin the
report." The largestpercentageof external respondents(30.8%) chosethe response,"as an
Appendix." The secondhighestpercentage(24.8%) of the internal respondentsand external
respondents(15%) chose"after Contents."Thus,when resultsfrom thesetwo responseswere
combined,apreference(32.1%for internalrespondentsand43.6%for externalrespondents)was
evident for the glossaryof termsto be locatednearthe backof the report asopposedto being
locatedas front matter.
Table 8. Opinionsof RespondentsConcerningthe Locationof the Glossaryof Terms
in LaRC-AuthoredTechnicalReports
Response
After Contents
After Introduction
As anAppendix
Nearfront of reportAND
wheretermsappear
Nearbackof reportAND
where terms appear
NO Glossary of Terms needed; just define
the term where it appears in the report
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
4.4 6
7.3 10
24.8 34
9.5 13
7.3 10
46.7 64
External respondents
%
15.0
3.8
30.8
11.3
12.8
26.3
(n = 133)
n
20
5
41
15
17
35
When Appendix Material Is Read
Survey respondents were asked a question concerning when they read appendix material--
before, with, or after the text. Summaries of the results from the internal and external respon-
dents are given in Table 9. The internal and external responses were very similar. A strong
majority (73% internally and about 77% externally) indicated that the appendixes were read after
the text. About 25% of the internal respondents and about 23% of the external respondents stated
that the appendixes were read with the text. About 2% of the internal and 0.0% of the external
respondents indicated that the appendix material was read prior to reading the text.
Location and Use of Illustrative Material
Internal and external respondents were asked three questions concerning the location and
use of illustrative material (such as tables, graphs, and photographs) in NASA Langley-authored
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technical reports. A summary of the results from the internal and external respondents is
presented in Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13.
Table 9. When Respondents Usually Read Appendix Material
in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Before the text
With the text
After the text
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
°rib n
2.2 3
24.8 34
73.0
External respondents
%
0.0
23.3
100 76.7
(n- 133)
n
0
31
102
About 47% of the internal and about 36% of the external respondents indicated that a list
of figures or tables should ONLY be included in NASA Langley-authored technical reports when
there is a lot of illustrative material (e.g., over 10 figures, photos, or tables). About 34% of the
internal respondents and about 29% of the external respondents reported that "No List of Figures
and Tables Needed" in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. About 22% of external re-
spondents indicated that NASA Langley-authored technical reports should always contain a list
of figures or tables whenever a report contains illustrative material.
Table 10. Opinions of Respondents Concerning the Need for a List of Figures or Tables
in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Only when illustrative material is
integrated with the text
!Only when illustrative material is separate from
the text; at the end of the report
Only when there is a lot of illustrative material
(e.g., over 10 figures, photos or tables)
Always; whenever a report contains
illustrative material
No List of Figures and Tables needed
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
o_ n
4.4 6
5.8 8
47.4 65
8.0 11
34.3 47
External respondents
%
(n = 133)
n
6.8
6.0
36.1
21.8
29.3
9
8
48
29
39
Internal and external respondents were asked about the integration of illustrative material
as opposed to group it at the end of the report (Table 11). The survey results show that about
77% of the internal and about 80% of the external respondents preferred that the illustrative
material be integrated with the text as opposed to being grouped in the back matter.
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Table 11. Opinions of Respondents Concerning Integration of Illustrative Material
as Opposed to Grouping It At the End of NASA LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Integrated with text
Separate from text; at end
of report
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
%
77.4
22.6
106
31
External respondents
%
79.7
20.3
(n = 133)
106
27
Table 12 contains the responses to the third question concerning the placement of
illustrative material. About 31% of the internal and about 50% of the external respondents
indicated that integration of tables and figures did not interrupt their reading no matter how much
illustrative material the report contained. The illustrative-page/text-page ratio which interrupted
reading was placed at two by about 49% of the internal respondents and about 35% of the
external respondents; at three by about 14% of internal and 9% of external respondents; and at
four or more by about 6% of internal and 6% of external respondents.
Table 12. Opinions of Respondents Concerning the Amount of Illustrative Material
That Can be Integrated with the Text of LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Without Interrupting the Reader
Response
Yes, when there are two pages of
illustrative material for every page
of text
Yes, when there are three pages of
illustrative material for every page
of text
Yes, when there are four or more
pages of illustrative material for
every page of text
No, I always prefer to have illustrative
material integrated in text
Internal respondents
(n --
%
48.9
13.9
5.8
31.4
137)
n
67
19
8
43
External respondents
(n = 133)
% n
35.3 47
9.0 12
6.0 8
49.6 66
Finally, respondents were asked when they read the illustrative included in NASA
Langley-authored technical reports. Summaries of the internal and external responses are
presented in Table 13.
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Table 13. When Respondents Usually Read Illustrative Material
in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Before the text
_With the text
After the text
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
16.8 23
80.3 110
2.9 4
External respondents
(n = 133)
%
18.0
79.7
2.3
n
24
106
3
Most respondents (80.3% internally; 79.7% externally) indicated that the illustrative
material was read with the text. Some respondents (16.% internally and 18% externally)
indicated that the illustrative material was read before the text. Only a few respondents (4%
internally and 2.3% externally) indicated that the illustrative material was read after the text.
Format of Reference Citations
Survey respondents were asked to specify their preference between three formats for
reference citations in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. Summaries of the internal and
external respondents' responses are presented in Table 14.
Table 14. Preferences of Respondents Concerning the Format of Reference
Citations Used in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Cited in text by author/year
(e.g., Jones 1978) but with an
alphabetic list in back of report
Cited in text by number (e.g., reference 16)
with a numbered list in back of report
Cited in text by footnote (e.g., Jones 12)
with a numbered list in back of report
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
o_ n
27.7 38
52.6 72
19.7 27
External respondents
(n = 133)
%
27.8
55.6
16.5
n
37
74
22
About 53% of the internal respondents and about 56% of the external respondents
preferred references in the text to be cited by number (e.g., reference 16) with a numbered list
in back of report. About 28% of the internal respondents and about 28% of the external
respondents preferred references cited in text by author/year (e.g., Jones 1978) but with an
alphabetic list in back of report. About 20% of the internal respondents and about 17% of the
external respondents preferred references cited in text by footnote (e.g., Jones 12) with a numbered
list in back of report.
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Specifications of Units for Dimensional Values
Respondents were asked to specify their preferences regarding the use of the International
System (S.I.) units and U.S. Customary units for dimensional values in NASA Langley-authored
technical reports. Table 15 contains the results of the survey responses concerning this question.
Table 15. Preferences of Respondents Concerning Units for Dimensional Values Specified
in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
The International System (S.I.) units
(e.g., meter, kilogram)
U.S. Customary units (e.g., foot, pound)
S.I. units with U.S. Customary units
in parentheses
U.S. Customary units with S.I. units
in parentheses
Internal respondents External respondents
(n = 137) (n = 133)
% n
24.1
38.0
15.3
22.6
33
52
21
31
% n
26.3 36
22.6 30
18.8 25
32.3 42
There was no overall agreement among either survey groups as to how dimensional values
should be specified in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. Thirty-eight percent of the
internal respondents selected U.S. Customary units (e.g., foot, pound) followed by the Inter-
national System (S.I.) units (24.1%), and U.S. Customary units with S.I. units in parentheses
(e.g., meter, kilogram) (22.6%). About 32% of the external respondents selected U.S. Cus-
tomary units with S.I. units in parentheses, followed by the International System (S.I.) units
(e.g., meter, kilogram) (26.3%), and U.S. Customary units (e.g., foot, pound) (22.6%).
Column Layout and Right Margin Treatment
Respondents were asked to state their preferences concerning one or two column layouts
and ragged or justified fight margins. Table 16 summarizes the results of survey respondents.
About 41% of the internal respondents preferred two columns; justified right margin, followed
by a mixed format; one and two columns intermixed as mathematical material dictates (21.2%).
About 34% of the external respondents preferred one column; justified fight margin followed by
two columns; justified right margin (24.1%). Overall, a two column format (48.9%) was pre-
ferred by internal respondents and a one column format was preferred by external respondents
(51.1%). Justified right margins were preferred over ragged right margins by about 53% of the
internal respondents and about 63% of the external respondents.
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Table 16. Preferences of Respondents Concerning Column Layout and Right Margin
Treatment in LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Two columns; justified right margin
Two columns; ragged right margin
One column; justified right margin
One column; ragged right margin
Mixed format; one and two columns
intermixed as mathematical
material dictates
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
40.9 56
8.0 11
12.4 17
17.5 24
21.2 29
External respondents
(n = 133)
%
24.1
6.0
33.8
17.3
18.8
n
32
8
45
23
25
Person and Voice
Survey respondents were asked to specify their preference in regard to person and voice
in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. Table 17 summarizes the results of the internal and
external respondents.
Table 17. Preferences of Respondents Concerning Person and Voice for
LaRC-Authored Technical Reports
Response
Passive voice, third person
Active voice, third person
Active voice, first person
Internal respondents
(n = 137)
% n
64.2 88
14.6 20
21.2 29
External respondents
(n = 133)
%
47.4
17.3
35.3
63
23
47
Among both groups, the passive voice, third person option was chosen most often as the
preferred writing style. Among internal respondents, about 64% selected this preference. Among
external respondents, about 47% selected this preference. Considering voice alone, internal
respondents preferred the passive voice (64%) over the active voice (35%). On the other hand,
external respondents preferred the active voice (53%) over the passive voice (47%).
The majority of both internal (78.8%) and external (64.7%) respondents preferred that
third person be used rather than first person in NASA Langley-authored technical reports. It
should be noted, however, that a higher percentage of external respondents (35.3%) preferred first
person than did the internal group (21.2%).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recognition of the importance of knowledge as an asset and a source of competitive advantage
is driving organizations to find ways of optimizing and managing this resource. Under the
general rubric of "knowledge management," organizations in the private and public sectors have
begun exploring methods for creating and deriving value from explicit and tacit organizational
knowledge resources. Although there is no single, agreed-upon approach to the practice,
knowledge management; in general, encompasses a variety of strategies, methods, and tech-
nologies for leveraging the intellectual capital and know-how of organizations for competitive
advantage. In brief, the practices associated with knowledge management include identifying and
mapping both the tacit and explicit knowledge of organizations; importing potentially useful
knowledge from the external environment; making relevant knowledge available to users in forms
that best meet their knowledge requirements; winnowing and filtering out unnecessary or ir-
relevant information; creating new knowledge that can provide competitive advantage; sharing
the best methods and practices for completing knowledge-based work; and applying strategies,
techniques, and tools that support the foregoing activities.
Sources of knowledge external to an organization are often critical to the innovation
process and to the commercial success of various products, including large commercial aircraft.
Studies have proved this statement true for entire nations (e.g., Japan) and for entire industries
(e.g., computers). At the organizational level, the results of studies suggest that most innovation
results from knowledge that resides external to the organization. Ergo, the ability of organiza-
tions to exploit external knowledge is critical to technological innovation and R&D. Several
factors affect an organization's capacity to absorb knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to
commercial ends. Several factors affect an organization's capacity to absorb knowledge,
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. For example, organizations that conduct their own
(internal) R&D are better able to absorb external knowledge than are those organizations that do
not. It appears that experience, at both the organizational and individual levels, with similar or
related knowledge, determines in large part an organization's ability to evaluate, absorb, and
utilize external knowledge.
The technical report is a primary means by which the results of federally funded R&D
are made available to the U.S. aerospace community. The history of technical report literature
in the U.S. coincides almost entirely with the development of aeronautics and the aviation
industry. The boundaries of technical report literature are difficult to establish because of wide
variations in the content, purpose, and audience being addressed. Their formats vary; they might
be brief (two pages) or lengthy (500 pages). They appear as microfiche, computer printouts or
vugraphs, and often they are loose leaf (with periodic changes that need to be inserted) or have
a paper cover, and often contain foldouts. Their contents may include statistical data, catalogs,
directions, design criteria, conference papers and proceedings, literature reviews, or biblio-
graphies. Technical reports permit prompt dissemination of data results on a typically flexible
distribution basis; they can convey the total research story, including exhaustive exposition,
detailed tables, ample illustrations, and full discussion of unsuccessful approaches and their
distribution can be limited or restricted. Therefore, technical report collections constitute an
important part of an organization's intellectual assets. Nevertheless, the body of available
knowledge is simply inadequate to determine the role that the technical report plays in the dif-
fusion of knowledge in the U.S. aerospace industry.
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